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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to introduce a tighter definition for the marginal
pricing rule. By means of an example, we illustrate the improvements that one
gets with the new definition with respect to the former one with the Clarke’s
normal cone.
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1 Introduction
Guesnerie (1975) is the first who studied the second welfare theorem in a general equi-
librium setting with non-convex production sets at the level of generality of Debreu
(1959). To modelize the marginal cost pricing rule, he considered the normal cone of
Dubovickii and Miljutin, that is, the firm follows the marginal cost pricing rule at a
production y for a price vector p if p belongs to the normal cone of Dubovickii and
Miljutin of the production set at y. This definition allows to encompass several cases:
when the production set is convex, then we recover the standard profit maximizing be-
havior, when the production set is smooth, the unique normalized price satisfying the
marginal cost pricing rule is the unique normalized outward normal vector, and, when
the production set is defined by a finite set of smooth inequality constraints satisfying
a qualification condition, the normal cone is generated by the gradient vectors of the
binding constraints.
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2Later, Cornet (1990) (but the first version was written in 1982) proposes to use
the Clarke’s normal cone (see Clarke (1983)) to represent the marginal pricing rule for
the existence problem. Indeed, this cone exhibits two additional fundamental proper-
ties: when the production set is closed and satisfies the free-disposal assumption, the
Clarke’s normal cone is convex and has a closed graph. These properties were used
in Bonnisseau-Cornet (1990) to prove the existence of marginal pricing equilibria with
several producers.
Then, Khan (1999) (but the first version was written in the eighties) considers the
limiting normal cone to extend the second welfare theorem. This cone is not necessarily
convex and may be strictly smaller than the Clarke’s normal cone. After him, several
extensions were made in infinite dimensional spaces. Nevertheless the example of Beato
and Mas-Colell (1983) shows that an equilibrium may not exists with the limiting
normal cone or with the cone of Dubovickii and Miljutin, although an equilibrium
exists with the Clarke’s one.
The major drawback of the Clarke’s normal cone is that it is too large in the sense
that it is defined as the convex hull of the limiting normal cone. So, some vectors belong
to the Clarke’s normal cone since they are a convex combination of normal vectors but
they do not satisfy a “normality” condition. Note also that Jouini (1988) exhibits a
production set where the Clarke’s normal cone is the positive orthant for every weakly
efficient production. So, in that case, the marginal pricing rule puts no restriction on
the firm’s behavior1.
The purpose of this note is to introduce a new definition of the marginal pricing rule
by considering the so-called intermediate normal cone borrowed from Cornet-Czarnecki
(2001). This cone lies between the limiting and the Clarke’s normal cones.
After a presentation of the definition of the intermediate normal cone, we provide
an example of a production set in a three-commodity economy, which shows that the
marginal pricing rule can be not convex valued. This implies that the set of prices
satisfying the marginal pricing rule can be strictly smaller than the Clarke’s normal
cone. The non-convex production set is inspired from an example in Czarnecki-RIfford
(2004).
We compute the unique optimal marginal pricing rule equilibrium with our new
definition. We also exhibit another price-allocation pair, which is a marginal pricing rule
equilibrium when the marginal pricing rule is defined by the Clarke’s normal cone. This
second equilibrium is not productive efficient. Consequently, the use of the intermediate
normal cone to define the marginal pricing rule leads to a tighter notion of equilibria,
which may exhibit better optimality properties.
Another advantage of our new definition of the marginal pricing rule is that it comes
from an approximation process. So, one can expect a better robustness of the equilib-
rium set. In our example, we can find a converging sequence of smooth approximation
of the non-convex production set such that the equilibrium sets of the approximate
smooth economies converge to the unique optimal marginal pricing rule. Hence the sec-
1See also the functionnal version [12] and its recent generalizations [3, 4]
3ond non efficient marginal pricing rule coming with the Clarke’s normal cone disappears
with a small perturbation of the production set.
It is interesting to introduce a new notion of normal cone if we can expect that
a marginal pricing equilibrium exists under reasonable assumptions like the ones of
Bonnisseau-Cornet (1990). Even if the marginal pricing rule is not convex valued, the
intermediate normal cone enjoys fixed-point like properties, which allows us to conjec-
ture that we can get the existence of an equilibrium under rather general conditions.
It is worth to note that our new definition does not answer all criticisms. Indeed,
for the Jouini’s example, the marginal pricing rule with the intermediate normal cone
is again the whole positive orthant. But, we illustrate another open question with our
example. Indeed, Cornet-Czarnecki (2001) consider external smooth approximation
of the sets. It is also possible for the production sets to consider internal smooth
approximation since they are epi-lipschitz. We show that the intermediate normal cone
is not the same when we consider external or internal approximations. At this stage, we
do not know what is the right approximation process leading to the smallest possible
normal cone.
2 The marginal pricing rule
We2 consider a production set Y in a `-commodity economy, that is Y is a subset of R`
satisfying the following assumption:
Assumption P: Y is a nonempty, closed subset of R`, Y 6= R` and Y − R`+ = Y .
We now recall several definitions of normal vectors and normal cones. The proximal
normal cone to Y at y ∈ Y is the set of the perpendicular vectors to Y at y, that is
NPY (y) = {p ∈ R` | ∃ρ > 0, B(y + ρp, ρ‖p‖) ∩ Y = ∅}
The limiting normal cone and the Clarke’s normal cone to Y at y are then defined
by:
NLY (y) = lim sup
y′∈Y,y′→y
NPY (y
′)
where lim sup is taken in the sense of Painleve´, which means that p ∈ NLY (y) if there
exists a sequence (yν , pν) converging to (y, p) and such that yν ∈ Y and pν ∈ NPY (yν)
for every integers ν.
NCY (y) = clcoN
L
Y (y)
To introduce the new notion of normal cone, we consider the distance function
dY to Y and its generalized gradient. We know that dY is Lipschitz and, thus, from
2Notations: if p and y are vectors of R`, p · y is the usual inner product of R` and ‖y‖ is the
associated norm. For ρ > 0, B(y, ρ) is the open ball of center y and radius ρ. If Y is a subset of
R`, then clY (resp. coY , bdY , coneY ) denotes the closure (resp. the convex hull, the boundary, the
convex conic hull) of Y . dY is the distance function to Y , that is dY (y) = inf{‖y − y′‖ | y′ ∈ Y }.
4Rademacher’s Theorem, almost everywhere differentiable. We denote by dom(∇dY )
the domain on which dY is differentiable. The Clarke’s generalized gradient ∂dY (y) of
dY at y is defined as:
∂dY (y) = co lim sup
y′∈dom(∇dY ),y′→y
∇dY (y′)
For y ∈ Y , the intermediate normal cone is defined as follows:
N IY (y) = ∪t≥0t lim sup
y′ /∈Y,y′→y
∂dY (y
′)
We recall the following elementary properties of the above normal cones. The proof
can be found in Cornet-Czarnecki (2001).
Proposition 1 For every y ∈ Y ,
a) NLY (y) ⊂ N IY (y) ⊂ NCY (y);
b) Under Assumption P, the three normal cones are included in R`+ and are different
from {0}.
c) If Y is convex, the three normal cones coincide with the usual normal cone of the
convex analysis, that is {p ∈ R` | p · y ≥ p · y′,∀y′ ∈ Y }.
We propose to define the marginal pricing rule, which associates to a weakly efficient
production the set of admissible prices as follows.
Definition 1 The marginal pricing rule A price-production pair (p, y) ∈ R` \{0}×
bdYj satisfies the marginal pricing rule if:
p ∈ N IY (y).
The interest of this new definition with respect to the previous one using the Clarke’s
normal cone is that, for a given production, it provides always a smaller set of prices
satisfying the marginal pricing rule since the intermediate normal cone is included in
the Clarke’s normal cone. But our main interest is the existence problem of a marginal
pricing equilibrium, since for the second welfare theorem, the limiting normal cone,
which is the smaller one, is sufficient.
The intermediate normal cone is not always convex valued, as it is illustrated in the
example below. But, we could expect getting an equilibrium through an approximation
argument. Indeed, in Cornet-Czarnecki (2001), a smooth approximation result is proved
for the compact epi-Lipschitzian sets. Actually, the result is true for a larger class but
we restrict ourself to the epi-Lipschitzian ones since Assumption P implies that Y is
epi-Lipschitzian. In the following, G(NCY ) (resp. G(N
I
Y )) denotes the graph of the
Clarke’s (resp. intermediate) normal cone, that is
G(NCY ) = {(y, p) ∈ Y × R` | p ∈ NCY (y)}
5Theorem 2.1 Let Y be a compact epi-Lipschitizian subset of R`. Y admits a smooth
normal approximation (Yk)k∈N in the sense that:
(i) for every k, Yk is a compact and smooth subset of R`, that is a closed C∞ subman-
ifold with boundary of R` of full dimension;
(ii) for every k, Yk+1 ⊂ Yk ⊂ {y ∈ R` | dY (y) < 1} and Y = ∩k∈NYk;
(iii) lim supk→∞G(N
C
Yk
) ⊂ G(N IY ).
Note that the three normal cones to Yk coincide since Yk is a smooth sub-manifold
of R`. The problem to apply this result for the existence of an equilibrium comes from
the fact that Assumption P implies that Y is not bounded, hence non-compact. So
the approximation argument cannot be directly done on the production set but on a
compact subset of it.
In the next section, we provide an example of a three-commodity economy with
two producers. We show that a marginal pricing equilibrium exists for the marginal
pricing rule defined by the intermediate normal cone and a non-efficient additional
price-allocation pair exists where the price belongs to the Clarke’s normal cones at the
production. So, the use of the intermediate normal cone allows us to provide a more
precise result on the set of equilibria.
3 An Example
We consider a three-good economy with one consumer and two producers. The utility
function of the unique consumer is u(a, b, c) = abc and his initial endowments is ω =
(1, 3, 1). The two first commodities are inputs and the third one is an output. The
production sets are defined by mean of production functions.
Y1 = {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | a ≤ 0, b ≤ 0, c ≤ max{−a,−b}}
Y2 = {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | a ≤ 0, b ≤ 0, c ≤ −(3/2)a− (1/2)b}
3.1 Computation of the marginal pricing rule
The second producer has a convex production technology with constant returns. So,
the marginal pricing rule coincides with the maximization of profit, and the normal
cone is the standard normal cone of the convex analysis.
For the first producer, the technology is non convex even if there are constant returns
to scale. We now describe the normal cones for the weakly efficient productions in Y1.
We have nine different cases but the most interesting one is at the origin. Except on the
half line {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | a = b ≤ 0, c = −a}, the three definitions of the normal cone
coincide and the computation is easy since the production set is a polyedral convex set
in a neighborhood of the production.
6Case I: y1 = (a, b, c), a < 0, b = 0, c < −a, NLY1(y1) = N IY1(y1) = NCY1(y1) =
cone{(0, 1, 0)};
Case II: y1 = (a, b, c), a = b = 0, c < 0,
NLY1(y1) = N
I
Y1
(y1) = N
C
Y1
(y1) = cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)};
Case III: y1 = (a, b, c), a = 0, b < 0, c < −b, NLY1(y1) = N IY1(y1) = NCY1(y1) =
cone{(1, 0, 0)},
Case IV: y1 = (a, b, c), a = 0, b < 0, c = −b, NLY1(y1) = N IY1(y1) = NCY1(y1) =
cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1)};
Case V: y1 = (a, b, c), b < a < 0, c = −b, NLY1(y1) = N IY1(y1) = NCY1(y1) =
cone{(0, 1, 1)};
Case VI: y1 = (a, b, c), a = b < 0, c = −b, NLY1(y1) = cone{(1, 0, 1)} ∪ cone{(0, 1, 1)};
N IY1(y1) = N
C
Y1
(y1) = cone{(1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)};
Case VII: y1 = (a, b, c), a < b < 0, c = −a, NLY1(y1) = N IY1(y1) = NCY1(y1) =
cone{(1, 0, 1)};
Case VIII: y1 = (a, b, c), a < 0, b = 0, c = −a,
NLY1(y1) = N
I
Y1
(y1) = N
C
Y1
(y1) = cone{(1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0)};
Case IX: y1 = (0, 0, 0),
NLY1(y1) = cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)} ∪ cone{(1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1)}∪
cone{(0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)};
N IY1(y1) = cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)} ∪ cone{(1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)};
NCY1(y1) = cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)};
We remark that at the production (0, 0, 0) the limiting normal cone is strictly in-
cluded in the intermediate normal cone, which is strictly included in the Clarke’s normal
cone, and is not convex.
To obtain the above formula, it suffices to study the distance function dY1 to Y1.
Since Y1 is the union of two closed convex cones Z1 = {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | a ≤ 0, b ≤ 0, c ≤
−a} and Z2 = {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | a ≤ 0, b ≤ 0, c ≤ −b}, dY1 is the infimum of dZ1 and
dZ2 . The functions dZ1 and dZ2 are convex and continuously differentiable outside Y1.
Consequently, the generalized gradient of dY1 at y1 outside Y1 is reduced to the gradient
of dZ1 or dZ2 at y1 if dZ1(y1) is strictly less than dZ2(y1) or dZ2(y1) is strictly less than
dZ1(y1). When dZ1(y1) is equal to dZ2(y1), then the generalized gradient of dY1 is the
convex hull of the gradients of dZ1 and dZ2 . Consequently, the gradient of dY1 is not
reduced to a singleton only if the two gradients of dZ1 and dZ2 differ, that is when the
projections of y1 on Z1 and Z2 are not the same. This holds true on the following
domains:
D1 = {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | a = b ≥ 0, c > a}
7D2 = {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | a = b < 0, c > −a}
If y1 = (a, a, c) ∈ D1,
the projection on Z1 is (
a−c
2
, 0, c−a
2
) and the gradient of dZ1 is
1q
(a+c)2
2
+a2
(a+c
2
, a, a+c
2
),
the projection on Z2 is (0,
a−c
2
, c−a
2
) and the gradient of dZ2 is
1q
(a+c)2
2
+a2
(a, a+c
2
, a+c
2
),
and ∂dY1(y1) =
1q
(a+c)2
2
+a2
co{(a+c
2
, a, a+c
2
), (a, a+c
2
, a+c
2
)}.
If y1 = (a, a, c) ∈ D2,
the projection on Z1 is (
a−c
2
, a, c−a
2
) and the gradient of dZ1 is
√
2
a+c
(a+c
2
, 0, a+c
2
),
the projection on Z2 is (a,
a−c
2
, c−a
2
) and the gradient of dZ2 is
√
2
a+c
(0, a+c
2
, a+c
2
),
and ∂dY1(y1) =
√
2
a+c
co{(a+c
2
, 0, a+c
2
), (0, a+c
2
, a+c
2
)}.
3.2 Computation of Equilibria
A marginal pricing equilibrium is a collection (p∗, x∗, y∗1, y
∗
2) in R3+ \ {0}×R3+× bdY1×
bdY2 such that x
∗ = y∗1 + y
∗
2 + ω, p
∗ ∈ N IY1(y∗1) ∩ N IY2(y∗2) and x∗ is a solution of
the maximization of the utility function u on the budget set {x ∈ R3+ | p∗ · x ≤
p∗ · (y∗1 + y∗2 + ω)}.
Using the definition of the marginal pricing rule by the intermediate normal cone,
the economy admits only one marginal pricing equilibrium, which is(
q∗ =
(
1
2
,
1
4
,
1
4
)
, ξ∗ = (1, 2, 2), ζ∗1 = (0,−1, 1), ζ∗2 = (0, 0, 0)
)
To check that this is the only one equilibrium, we can remark that the equilibrium
price must belong to cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (3
7
, 2
7
, 2
7
)}. Furthermore, the equilibrium is
also an equilibrium of the economy with the global production set Y = Y1 + Y2, which
is convex. Actually Y = {(a, b, c) ∈ R3 | c ≤ −(3/2)a− b}. So we have just to compute
a competitive equilibrium with a unique producer having constant return to scale.
This equilibrium is optimal since it satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions of
optimality for the global production set Y .
The new definition of the marginal pricing rule allows us to withdraw a non-efficient
equilibrium that appears with the Clarke’s normal cone. This is a direct consequence
of the fact that the intermediate normal cone at 0 is strictly smaller than the Clarke’s
normal cone.
One easily checks that(
p∗ =
(
1
2
,
1
6
,
1
3
)
, x∗ =
(
8
9
,
8
3
,
4
3
)
, y∗1 = (0, 0, 0), y
∗
2 =
(
−1
9
,−1
3
,
1
3
))
satisfies the definition of a marginal pricing equilibrium if we replace the intermediate
normal cone by the Clarke’s normal cone. Note that the consumer strictly prefers ξ∗
to x∗ and the productions (y∗1, y
∗
2) are not productive efficient. Indeed, the quantity of
8the output is 1
3
whereas with the quantities of inputs (−1
9
,−1
3
), one can produce 1
2
if
the quantity of the first commodity is given to the second producer and the quantity
of the second commodity is given to the first producer.
4 Open Question
The intermediate normal cone leads to a tighter marginal pricing rule. But it remains
to know if it is the tightest or not. The following computation shows that the answer
is no since by considering another definition of the normal cone through an interior
approximation, we get a different normal cone. In our example, the primary definition
gives the smallest normal cone. But, if we reverse the production set as it is explained
below, the contrary holds true. Thus, we have provided an improvement by introducing
this new definition of the marginal pricing rule, but the question to define the “best”
normal cone compatible with the existence of an equilibrium is still open. Note that
the question is irrelevant with the Clarke’s normal cone since for the epi-lipschitzian
set, it is known that the normal cone coincides with the opposite of the normal cone of
the closure of the complementary.
We compute now the intermediate normal cone by an interior approximation. This
means that we consider Γ1, the opposite of the closure of the complementary of Y1. An
exterior approximation of Γ1 is an interior approximation of Y1.
We can find a difference between N IY1(y1) and N
I
Γ1
(−y1) only at (0, 0, 0) since,
otherwise the set Y1 is either an half space, the intersection of two half spaces or
the union of two half spaces, locally around y1. Indeed, the following shows that
N IΓ1(0, 0, 0) is the union of the three following cones: cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (12 , 12 , 1)},
cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1
2
, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
, 1)} and cone{(0, 1, 0), (1
2
, 0, 1
2
), (1
2
, 1
2
, 1)}.
Thus, N IΓ1(0, 0, 0) is strictly than N
I
Y1
(0, 0, 0) since the interior of the two cones
cone{(1, 0, 0), (2
5
, 1
5
, 2
5
), (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)} and cone{(0, 1, 0), (1
5
, 2
5
, 2
5
), (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)} are included in
N IΓ1(0, 0, 0) and are not included in N
I
Y1
(0, 0, 0). Nevertheless, N IΓ1(0, 0, 0) is still strictly
smaller than the Clarke’s normal cone and non-convex.
We now compute the generalized gradient of the distance function dΓ1 outside Γ1. We
remark that Γ1 is the union of the three following convex cones: H1 = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 |
x ≤ 0}, H2 = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 | y ≤ 0} and H3 = {(x, y, z) ∈ R3, x + z ≤ 0, y + z ≤ 0}.
For (x, y, z) /∈ Γ1, let K(x, y, z) = {k ∈ {1, 2, 3} | dHk(x, y, z) = dΓ1(x, y, z)}.
The distance function dHk are defined as follows:
dH1(x, y, z) = x and ∇dH1(x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0);
dH2(x, y, z) = y and ∇dH1(x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0);
dH3(x, y, z) is equal to:
−(x+ z)
√
2
2
if −x+ 2y + z ≤ 0
1
3
√
(2x− y + z)2 + (−x+ 2y + z)2 + (x+ y + 2z)2 if
{ −x+ 2y + z > 0
2x− y + z > 0
−(y + z)
√
2
2
if 2x− y + z ≤ 0
9and ∇dH1(x, y, z) =

(
√
2
2
, 0,
√
2
2
) if −x+ 2y + z ≤ 0
(2x−y+z,−x+2y+z,x+y+2z)√
(2x−y+z)2+(−x+2y+z)2+(x+y+2z)2 if
{ −x+ 2y + z > 0
2x− y + z > 0
(0,
√
2
2
,
√
2
2
) if 2x− y + z ≤ 0
So, if (x, y, z) has a unique projection and Γ1, which happens when K(x, y, z) is a
singleton, the generalized gradient of the distance function to Γ1 is a singleton in the
set {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)} ∪ {
√
2
2
√
t2+1−t(t, 1− t, 1) | t ∈ [0, 1]}.
We now study the case where K(x, y, z) is not a singleton. Then, ∂dΓ1(x, y, z) =
co{∇dHk(x, y, z) | k ∈ K(x, y, z)}. K(x, y, z) = {1, 2, 3} if y = x and z = (
√
3 − 1)x.
Then
∂dΓ1(x, y, z) = co{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0),
√
2√
3
(
1
2
,
1
2
, 1)}
Considering the limit when x tends to 0, one concludes that
cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1
2
,
1
2
, 1)} ⊂ N IΓ1(0, 0, 0)
K(x, y, z) = {1, 2} if y = x and z > (√3− 1)x. Then
∂dΓ1(x, y, z) = co{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0)}
With respect to the previous case, this does not add new elements in the intermediate
normal cone.
K(x, y, z) = {1, 2} if there exists α > 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1
2
] such that (x, y, z) =
α(
√
2r,
√
2r + 1− 2λ,−√2r + λ+ 1), with r = √λ2 − λ+ 1. Then,
∂dΓ1(x, y, z) = co{(1, 0, 0),
1
r
√
2
(λ, 1− λ, 1)
Considering the limit when α tends to 0, one concludes that
cone{(1, 0, 0), (0, 1
2
,
1
2
), (
1
2
,
1
2
, 1)} ⊂ N IΓ1(0, 0, 0)
K(x, y, z) = {1, 2} if there exists α > 0 and λ ∈ [1
2
, 1], such that (x, y, z) = α(
√
2r+
2λ− 1,√2r,−√2r + 2− λ), with r = √λ2 − λ+ 1. Then,
∂dΓ1(x, y, z) = co{(0, 1, 0),
1
r
√
2
(λ, 1− λ, 1)
Considering the limit when α tends to 0, one concludes that
cone{(0, 1, 0), (1
2
, 0,
1
2
), (
1
2
,
1
2
, 1)} ⊂ N IΓ1(0, 0, 0)
Combining all the possibilities, leads to the result.
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